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The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and Canadian Officials 
Abroad 
Donald J. Rennie and Ramona Rothschild

 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 32(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
1
 
which defines the Charter‟s application, does not expressly impose 
territorial limits on its reach.
2
 As a consequence, it has fallen on the 
courts to interpret the scope of the Charter‟s application, and to 
determine whether and to what extent the Charter applies to government 
action outside Canada. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled on the application of the 
Charter to the actions of government officials outside Canada on several 
occasions. It has been firmly established that the Charter does not apply 
to the actions of foreign authorities in foreign jurisdictions.
3
 Moreover, in 
                                                                                                             
  Counsel, Department of Justice Canada. All opinions expressed in this paper are those of 
the authors and do not in any way represent the views of the Attorney General of Canada, any 
official of the Department of Justice Canada or the policy of the Government of Canada. The authors 
would like to thank R. Jeff Anderson, Robert Frater, Hoi Kong and Doreen Mueller for their helpful 
comments and suggestions on the initial drafts of this paper. They would also like to thank Brian R. 
Evernden for his thoughtful presentation of this paper at Osgoode‟s 2008 Constitutional Cases 
Conference. Any errors are the responsibility of the authors. 
1  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2  Section 32(1) provides as follows: 
 This Charter applies  
(a)  to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the 
authority of Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and 
Northwest Territories; and  
(b)  to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within 
the authority of the legislature of each province. 
3  R. v. Harrer, [1995] S.C.J. No. 81, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 562 (S.C.C.); R. v. Terry, [1996] 
S.C.J. No. 62, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 207 (S.C.C.); Schreiber v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. 
No. 42, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 841 (S.C.C.). Note, however, that an individual may have a valid s. 7 claim 
in Canada even if the potential deprivation of his or her life, liberty or security will be effected 
abroad, if it is established that Canada‟s participation is a necessary precondition for the deprivation 
and if the deprivation is a foreseeable consequence of Canada‟s participation. See Suresh v. Canada 
128 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
2007, in R. v. Hape,
4
 a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada 
effectively overruled the majority‟s earlier decision in R. v. Cook5 and 
decided that the Charter does not apply to investigations by Canadian 
state actors in the territory of another state absent the foreign state‟s 
consent or some other limited basis recognized in international law. As a 
result, Canadian officials involved in investigations abroad generally do 
so under the laws and procedures of the foreign state.  
Both Cook and Hape were decided in the context of criminal 
prosecutions in Canada, where the issue was whether evidence obtained 
by Canadian state actors outside the country should be excluded at trial 
in Canada because it was obtained in a manner that did not conform to 
Charter standards. In 2008, in Canada (Justice) v. Khadr,
6
 the Supreme 
Court of Canada considered the application of the Charter in a case 
involving the activities of Canadian officials and their impact abroad 
upon a Canadian citizen‟s liberty interest and right to a fair process, 
where there was no domestic criminal prosecution and where the rights 
claimant was not even present in Canada.  
This paper will identify issues arising from the Hape and Khadr 
decisions that have been recently addressed by the Federal Courts. It is 
divided into two substantive parts. The first describes the Hape and 
Khadr decisions. The second describes how, in three recent decisions, 
the Federal Courts have addressed two issues arising from these 
decisions: (1) whether there exists a “fundamental human rights 
exception” to the general rule that the Charter does not apply extra-
territorially; and (2) whether non-Canadian citizens outside Canada who 
are not subjected to a Canadian judicial process are beneficiaries of 
Charter rights.  
                                                                                                             
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] S.C.J. No. 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, at para. 54 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Suresh”]. See also United States v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 
283 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Burns”] and Canada v. Schmidt, [1987] S.C.J. No. 24, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 
500 (S.C.C.). 
4  [2007] S.C.J. No. 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hape”]. 
5  [1998] S.C.J. No. 68, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cook”]. In Cook, the 
majority (Lamer C.J.C., Cory, Iacobucci, Major and Binnie JJ.) ruled that in rare circumstances the 
Charter could apply to the acts of Canadian officials outside Canada based on Canada‟s jurisdiction 
over its nationals where the application of Charter standards would not conflict with the concurrent 
territorial jurisdiction of the foreign state, thereby generating an “objectionable extraterritorial 
effect” (id., at para. 25). Here, they held that the Charter applied to the actions of Canadian 
detectives in interviewing the accused in the United States. 
6  [2008] S.C.J. No. 28, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Khadr”]. 
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II. THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA CASES 
1. R. v. Hape 
In Hape, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada
7
 held that the 
Charter does not apply to investigations carried out by Canadian state 
actors in the territory of another state absent the foreign state‟s consent 
or, more exceptionally, some other basis under international law. Hence, 
Canadian officials involved in investigations abroad are not bound by 
Charter requirements in the manner in which investigations are conducted. 
Rather, the law of the state in which the investigation occurred would 
apply.  
In Hape, the appellant was a Canadian businessman who had been 
convicted in Canada of money laundering. At his trial, the Crown had 
adduced documentary evidence that the RCMP had gathered from the 
accused‟s office in the Turks and Caicos. The accused had sought to 
have the evidence excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter,
8
 on 
the basis that it had been obtained in violation of his right under section 8 
to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.
9
  
The RCMP‟s investigation in the Turks and Caicos had been carried 
out under the authority and control of the Turks and Caicos police force. 
No warrant had been obtained authorizing perimeter searches of the 
accused‟s investment company in that country. Evidently a warrant was 
not required to conduct such searches under Turks and Caicos law, but in 
most circumstances one would have been required under Canadian law.  
At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Charter applied 
to the searches and seizures carried out by the RCMP officers outside 
Canada. The Court upheld the convictions, the majority determining that 
the Charter generally did not apply to searches and seizures carried out 
by Canadian state actors abroad, and did not apply in the circumstances 
of this case. 
                                                                                                             
7  The majority judgment of McLachlin C.J.C. and LeBel, Deschamps, Fish and Charron JJ. 
was written by LeBel J. 
8  Section 24(2) of the Charter provides as follows: 
 Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that evidence was 
obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this 
Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the 
circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. 
9  Section 8 of the Charter provides that “[e]veryone has the right to be secure against 
unreasonable search or seizure.” 
130 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
The majority directed that any inquiry into the extra-territorial 
application of the Charter “begins and ends” with section 32(1). That 
provision defines to whom and in what circumstances the Charter 
applies. The fact that a state actor is involved is not in itself sufficient; 
the activity in question must also fall within the “matters within the 
authority of” Parliament or the provincial legislatures.10 
Guided by the principle of statutory interpretation that legislation 
will be presumed to conform to international law as well as the principle 
of comity of nations, the majority of the Supreme Court interpreted 
section 32(1) with reference to principles of customary international law. 
Writing for the majority, LeBel J. was careful to draw a distinction 
between international law and comity, stating that “[i]nternational law is 
a positive legal order, whereas comity … is of the nature of a principle of 
interpretation.”11 
The majority asserted that under international law, the authority of a 
state to exercise jurisdiction over matters arising outside its territory is 
strictly limited.
12
 Of particular significance, by virtue of the territorial 
sovereignty of states, it is a well-established principle that a state cannot 
act to enforce, or give effect to, its laws within the territory of another 
state absent the other state‟s consent or, in exceptional cases, some other 
basis in international law.
13
 Absent such an exception, an investigation in 
a foreign state is not a matter within the authority of Parliament or the 
provincial legislatures for the purposes of section 32(1) of the Charter, as 
these bodies do not have the jurisdiction to authorize the enforcement of 
                                                                                                             
10  Hape, supra, note 4, at paras. 93-94. 
11  Id., at para. 50. 
12  Justice LeBel distinguished between three different types of jurisdiction. Prescriptive 
jurisdiction is the “power to make rules, issue commands or grant authorizations that are binding 
upon persons and entities”. Enforcement jurisdiction is “the power to use coercive means to ensure 
that rules are followed, commands are executed or entitlements are upheld”. Adjudicative 
jurisdiction is “the power of a state‟s courts to resolve disputes or interpret the law through decisions 
that carry binding force” (id., at para. 58). 
Justice LeBel explained that the primary basis for a state‟s jurisdiction is the principle of 
territoriality. A state has full authority to exercise jurisdiction — prescriptive, enforcement and 
adjudicative — over matters arising and people residing within its borders. A secondary basis for 
jurisdiction is the nationality principle. States may assert certain jurisdiction over acts occurring 
within the territory of a foreign state on the basis that their nationals are involved, in order to attach 
domestic consequences to events that occurred abroad. However, under international law, a state 
would not have the authority to enforce its laws over the national outside its borders (id., at paras. 
59-60). 
13  Id., at para. 65. 
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Canadian laws, including the Charter, over such a matter outside 
Canada.
14
 
The majority reasoned that if compliance with its legal requirements 
cannot be enforced, the Charter cannot be applied. Therefore, as a rule, 
the Charter does not apply to investigations in foreign countries. 
Exceptions to the rule may arise where the foreign state has consented to 
the application of Canadian law or, more exceptionally, where there 
exists some other basis in international law that would justify the 
Charter‟s application. Justice LeBel wrote: 
[T]he Charter cannot be applied if compliance with its legal 
requirements cannot be enforced. Enforcement of compliance with the 
Charter means that when state agents act, they must do so in 
accordance with the requirements of the Charter so as to give effect to 
Canadian law as it applies to the exercise of the state power at issue. 
However, … Canadian law cannot be enforced in another state‟s 
territory without that state‟s consent. Since extraterritorial enforcement 
is not possible, and enforcement is necessary for the Charter to apply, 
extraterritorial application of the Charter is impossible.
15
 
The majority was also guided in its interpretation of section 32(1) by 
the notion of comity, an interpretive principle which encourages states to 
cooperate with each other with mutual deference and respect. According 
to the majority, the principle of comity allows Canadian officers to 
participate in investigations abroad even where there is no obligation to 
do so. In addition, the principle of comity encourages a state seeking 
assistance from another state to respect the way in which the latter state 
chooses to provide assistance within its territory. Nonetheless, the 
majority noted that comity may not be required where the assisting state 
acts in violation of international law. Justice LeBel stated that Canadian 
                                                                                                             
14  Id., at paras. 57-69, 84-85, 104-105. The majority recognized that Canada has the 
authority to make laws having extraterritorial operation, and that Canada has enacted legislation with 
extraterritorial effects. For example, the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, 
c. 24, provides in s. 6(1) that every person who commits genocide, a crime against humanity or a war 
crime outside Canada is guilty of an indictable offence. Pursuant to s. 8, such a person may be 
prosecuted in Canada (a) if at the time of the offence the person was a Canadian citizen or a citizen 
of a state engaged in armed conflict against Canada, or the victim was a Canadian citizen or a citizen 
of a state allied with Canada in an armed conflict; or (b) if, after the time the offence was committed, 
the person is present in Canada. According to LeBel J., “[t]hese provisions exemplify valid 
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction, and any trial for such offences would constitute a legitimate 
exercise of extraterritorial adjudicative jurisdiction” (id., at para. 66). However, these provisions do 
not authorize Canada to enforce the prohibitions in a foreign state‟s territory by arresting the 
offender there. Id., at para. 66. 
15  Id., at para. 85. 
132 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
officials may be prohibited from participating abroad in activities 
sanctioned by foreign law that would place Canada in violation of its 
international human rights obligations.
16
 
The majority held that individuals cannot expect to take Charter 
rights with them outside Canada‟s borders. However, they articulated 
two means of protecting the interests of the individual. First, where the 
Crown seeks to adduce evidence gathered abroad at a trial in Canada, 
such evidence may be excluded under section 7 or section 11(d) of the 
Charter if to admit it would render the trial unfair.
17
  
Second, participation abroad by Canadian officials in activities that 
would violate Canada‟s international human rights obligations “might 
justify a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter because of the impact of 
those activities on Charter rights in Canada”.18 In such circumstances, 
there would be an exception to the principle of comity which would 
otherwise allow Canadian officers to participate.
19
  
Based on these considerations, the majority articulated a methodology 
to determine whether the Charter applies to investigations outside 
Canada by virtue of section 32(1). First, it must be determined whether 
the conduct at issue is that of a Canadian state actor. Second, if so, it 
must be determined whether the activity in question is a matter within the 
authority of Parliament or the provincial legislatures. Unless there is 
consent or some other exceptional basis in international law that would 
justify the application of the Charter to the extraterritorial activities of 
the state actor, such activities do not fall within the authority of 
Parliament or the provincial legislatures. According to the majority, in 
most cases there will be no such exception and the Charter will not 
apply.
20
  
                                                                                                             
16  Id., at paras. 50-52, 101. 
17  Id., at paras. 100, 108-112. A court must consider all of the circumstances in which 
evidence was gathered to determine whether its admission would render a trial unfair. It will not 
automatically follow that a trial will be unfair if evidence is admitted that was obtained in 
circumstances that did not meet Charter requirements (id., at paras. 108-109). 
18 Id., at para. 101. See also paras. 51-52, 90. 
19  Id., at paras. 90, 101. 
20  Id., at paras. 102-106, 113. In Hape, the majority found that the Turks and Caicos had not 
consented to the enforcement of Canadian law within its territory. In addition, although this matter 
was not raised on appeal, the majority found that the circumstances did not demonstrate that the 
admission of the evidence violated the appellant‟s right to a fair trial. 
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2.  Canada (Justice) v. Khadr 
In May 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada decided in Khadr that 
Canada was bound by the Charter where Canadian officials had 
participated overseas in a process that was contrary to Canada‟s 
international human rights obligations.
21
 In this case, the respondent, 
Omar Khadr, was a Canadian citizen who had been detained by U.S. 
Forces in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he faced terrorism-related 
charges before a U.S. Military Commission. Before the charges were 
laid, with the consent of U.S. authorities, Canadian officials had 
questioned him in Guantanamo Bay with regard to matters connected to 
the eventual charges, and had shared the product of those interviews with 
U.S. authorities. After formal charges were laid against him, for the 
purposes of raising full answer and defence to those charges and relying 
on R. v. Stinchcombe,
22
 Mr. Khadr sought disclosure in Canada under 
section 7 of the Charter of all documents relevant to the charges in the 
possession of the federal Crown, including the records of the interviews. 
Before the Supreme Court of Canada, relying on Hape, the Crown 
opposed this request, in part on the basis that the Charter did not apply 
outside Canada and hence did not govern the conduct of Canadian 
officials at Guantanamo Bay.
23
  
                                                                                                             
21  See also Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister), [2009] F.C.J. No. 462, 2009 FC 405 (F.C.), 
affd [2009] F.C.J. No. 893, 2009 FCA 246 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal granted [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 
286 (S.C.C.), wherein the Federal Court decided that in the special circumstances of that case — in 
particular, Mr. Khadr‟s youth at the relevant time and the direct involvement of Canadian authorities 
in his mistreatment at Guantanamo Bay by interrogating him despite knowing that he had been 
subjected to sleep deprivation techniques — Canada had violated Mr. Khadr‟s s. 7 Charter rights. 
According to the Court, the principles of fundamental justice obliged Canada to protect Mr. Khadr 
by taking appropriate steps to ensure that his treatment accorded with international human rights 
norms (id., at para. 75). To mitigate the effect of the violation, the Court ordered Canada to request 
Mr. Khadr‟s repatriation as soon as practicable. The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the 
government‟s appeal. On September 4, 2009, the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal. 
22  [1991] S.C.J. No. 83, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Stinchcombe”]. In 
Stinchcombe, the Court recognized that the right to make full answer and defence to criminal charges 
is entrenched in s. 7 of the Charter as a principle of fundamental justice. 
23  The Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal both rendered their decisions before 
Hape was released. The Federal Court dismissed Mr. Khadr‟s request for an order directing the 
Crown to provide him with disclosure ([2006] F.C.J. No. 640, 2006 FC 509 (F.C.)). The Federal 
Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding a sufficient causal connection between the actions of the 
government and the charges against Mr. Khadr so as to engage s. 7 of the Charter. The Court of 
Appeal ordered the Crown to produce unredacted copies of all relevant documents in its possession 
to the Federal Court for review under s. 38 of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5. In light 
of the fact that the Crown had already provided Mr. Khadr with redacted copies of some of the 
material in its possession further to requests under the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, 
c. A-1, and through production in other Federal Court proceedings commenced by Mr. Khadr, it was 
134 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Basing its decision on the exception to the principle of comity 
articulated in Hape, the Court unanimously ruled that the Charter applied 
in the circumstances, as Canadian officials had participated in a process 
that violated Canada‟s international human rights obligations. The Court 
relied on the fact that the regime providing for the detention and trial of 
Mr. Khadr at the time Canadian officials had interviewed him and shared 
the product of the interviews with U.S. authorities had been found by the 
U.S. Supreme Court to violate international human rights obligations to 
which Canada is a party (as well as U.S. domestic law).
24
 By sharing the 
product of their interviews with U.S. authorities, Canadian officials had 
participated in the process impugned by the U.S. Supreme Court and in 
so doing, they had participated in a process that was contrary to Canada‟s 
international human rights obligations.
25
 Accordingly, the deference to 
foreign law that would normally be required by the principle of comity 
did not apply, and Canada was “bound by the Charter” at the time it 
shared this information “to the extent that the conduct of Canadian 
officials involved it in a process that violated Canada‟s international 
obligations”.26  
According to the Court, Mr. Khadr‟s section 7 right to liberty was 
engaged by Canada‟s participation in the process that was contrary to 
Canada‟s international human rights obligations. In order to mitigate the 
effect of that participation, Canada had a duty under section 7 of the 
Charter to provide him with disclosure of materials in its possession, 
analogous to the disclosure duty in a domestic prosecution.
27
 However, 
the scope of disclosure was limited to materials arising from Canada‟s 
participation in the foreign process, as it was that participation that 
engaged Mr. Khadr‟s right to liberty.28 
                                                                                                             
left for the Federal Court to decide whether the Crown had complied with its disclosure obligation 
([2007] F.C.J. No. 672, 2007 FCA 182 (F.C.A.)).  
24  In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
See Khadr, supra, note 6, at paras. 21-25. Note that these decisions were issued after Canadian 
officials interviewed Mr. Khadr. 
25  Khadr, id., at para. 27. The Court was careful to point out that merely conducting 
interviews with a Canadian citizen detained abroad under a violative process may not constitute 
participation, as it may often be essential for Canadian officials to interview citizens being held by 
violative regimes in order to provide assistance.  
26  Id., at para. 26. 
27  Id., at paras. 29-32, 34, 37. The Court did not directly apply Stinchcombe, but found that 
the principles of fundamental justice bound the Crown in an analogous way. 
28  Id., at paras. 29-31.  
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The Court concluded that Canada had breached Mr. Khadr‟s section 
7 Charter right by refusing to comply with his request for disclosure.
29
 
The Court did not directly apply Stinchcombe by ordering full disclosure, 
but decided that Mr. Khadr was entitled under section 7 to disclosure 
from the Crown of the records of the interviews, as well as information 
given to U.S. authorities as a direct consequence of conducting the 
interviews, subject to claims for privilege and public interest immunity.
30
  
In and of itself, sharing the product of the interviews was not found 
to constitute a Charter breach.
31
  
III. ISSUES ARISING FROM HAPE AND KHADR 
1.  “Fundamental Human Rights Exception” 
Following Hape, the issue arose concerning whether the majority 
had articulated a “fundamental human rights exception” to the general 
rule against the extra-territorial application of the Charter, such that the 
Charter may be applied in foreign sovereign territory if Canadian state 
actors abroad are involved in fundamental human rights violations. 
Two months before the Supreme Court‟s Khadr decision was released, 
in Amnesty International Canada v. Canada (Canadian Forces)
32
 the 
                                                                                                             
29  Id., at paras. 33, 36.  
30  Id., at paras. 29-32, 37. The Supreme Court‟s disclosure order was more limited in scope 
than that of the Federal Court of Appeal. The latter Court ordered that the Crown produce 
unredacted copies of all documents in its possession which might be relevant to the charges (see id., 
at paras. 37, 39). See also Purdy v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] B.C.J. No. 1881, 230 D.L.R. 
(4th) 361 (B.C.C.A.). In Purdy, the British Columbia Court of Appeal decided that a Canadian 
citizen who had been charged with an offence in the United States was entitled to disclosure under 
the Charter of material obtained by the RCMP in the course of investigating the offence jointly with 
the FBI. The Court held that “s. 7 can be invoked if Canada‟s participation is causally connected to 
the deprivation of a liberty interest in a foreign state” (id., at para. 17) (emphasis in original). The 
Court noted that the deprivation of the right to full answer and defence occurred in Canada as a 
result of the RCMP‟s refusal to make disclosure, even though the effect of the deprivation would be 
abroad (id., at para. 20). In addition, the Court held that the disclosure order would not interfere with 
the sovereignty of the United States, since “disclosure does no more than put the respondent in the 
position where he can offer the evidence obtained by disclosure to the U.S. court; it does not decide 
for the court whether to admit the evidence or determine how it should be used” (id., at para. 24). 
31  Khadr, id., at para. 27.  
32  [2008] F.C.J. No. 356, 2008 FC 336 (F.C.), affd [2008] F.C.J. No. 1700, 2008 FCA 401 
(F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 63 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Amnesty”]. The 
applicants brought an application for judicial review with respect to the transfer or potential transfer 
to Afghan authorities of individuals detained by the Canadian Forces. They alleged that the 
arrangements between Canada and Afghanistan did not provide adequate substantive or procedural 
safeguards to ensure that detainees transferred to Afghanistan would not be exposed to a substantial 
136 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Federal Court concluded that the majority decision in Hape did not create 
a “fundamental human rights exception” justifying the extraterritorial 
application of the Charter, and that the Charter would not apply to 
restrain the conduct of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan.
33
  
In this case, the applicants argued that the Charter would apply to the 
actions of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan in transferring detainees 
into the custody of the Afghan authorities if such transfer exposed the 
detainees to a substantial risk of torture.
34
 In essence, their position was 
that because transferring detainees to a substantial risk of torture would 
violate Canada‟s international human rights obligations, the Charter would 
apply. 
The applicants relied on the majority‟s decision in Hape for the 
proposition that the Charter may exceptionally apply in the territory of 
another state where Canadian officials participate in activities in that 
state that violate Canada‟s international human rights obligations. The 
applicants believed that the existence of a “fundamental human rights 
exception” to the rule against the extra-territorial application of the 
Charter in Hape was evidenced by the majority‟s affirmation that the 
principle of comity may give way where the participation of Canadian 
officers in investigations abroad would place Canada in violation of its 
international human rights obligations. They also pointed to the 
majority‟s statement that in future cases, such participation might justify 
a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter because of the impact of 
those activities on Charter rights in Canada.
35
 
                                                                                                             
risk of torture. They sought declarations that ss. 7, 10 and 12 of the Charter applied to individuals 
detained by the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, a writ of prohibition preventing the transfer of 
detainees until such safeguards had been put in place and a writ of mandamus compelling the 
respondents to inquire into the status of detainees already transferred to Afghanistan and to demand 
their return. The parties agreed to submit two questions to the Court by way of a motion pursuant to 
Rule 107(1) of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106: (a) Does the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms apply during the armed conflict in Afghanistan to the detention of non-Canadians by the 
Canadian Forces or their transfer to Afghan authorities to be dealt with by those authorities?; and (b) 
If the answer to the above question is “no”, then would the Charter nonetheless apply if the 
applicants were ultimately able to establish that the transfer of the detainees in question would 
expose them to a substantial risk of torture? This paper does not address the issues in relation to 
question (a). 
33  Amnesty, id., at paras. 303-328 (F.C.). 
34  The Supreme Court of Canada has concluded that international law generally rejects 
extradition to the death penalty for abolitionist states (see Burns, supra, note 3) and deportation to a 
real risk of torture (see Suresh, supra, note 3). In both Burns and Suresh, the Supreme Court was 
dealing with removals of persons from Canada to a foreign state; in the Amnesty litigation, id., the 
individuals in question were outside Canada so the issue was one of extraterritorial transfer, not 
removal. 
35  Amnesty, supra, note 32, at paras. 305-307 (F.C.). 
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The Federal Court decided that no such exception to the territorial 
application of the Charter had been articulated in Hape. The Court 
reasoned that the application of the Charter cannot be dependent on 
whether a fundamental human right has been infringed. The Court wrote: 
Surely Canadian law, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, either applies in relation to the detention of individuals by 
the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan, or it does not. It cannot be that the 
Charter will not apply where the breach of a detainee‟s purported 
Charter rights is of a minor or technical nature, but will apply where the 
breach puts the detainee‟s fundamental human rights at risk. 
That is, it cannot be that it is the nature or quality of the Charter 
breach that creates extraterritorial jurisdiction, where it does not 
otherwise exist. That would be a completely unprincipled approach to 
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
36
  
The Court stated that to find that the Charter applied as a result of the 
seriousness of the impugned actions or their effects would be to conflate 
the question of the existence of Charter jurisdiction with the question of 
whether a fundamental right had been infringed.
37
 The Court also noted 
that if the application of the Charter were dependent on the nature of the 
breach, this would lead to “tremendous uncertainty” for Canadian state 
actors carrying out activities in foreign countries,
38
 presumably because 
they would not be governed by a legally predictable set of rules.  
In addition, the Federal Court found that the majority‟s reasons in 
Hape did not support the recognition of a “fundamental human rights 
exception”. According to the Court, the majority in Hape had stated that 
Canadian officials operating outside Canada cannot act in a way that 
violates Canada‟s international human rights obligations. However, it did 
not follow from the fact that international human rights law obligations 
may operate to constrain the activities of Canadian state actors abroad 
that the Charter would apply to such activities. The Federal Court also 
asserted that its interpretation of Hape was supported by the concurring 
decisions of Bastarache and Binnie JJ., both of whom saw the majority as 
substituting international human rights law for Charter guarantees.
39
  
The Court also considered the majority‟s statement in Hape that 
participation by Canadian officials operating oversees in activities that 
                                                                                                             
36  Id., at paras. 310-311. 
37  Id., at paras. 312-313. 
38  Id., at paras. 312-314. 
39  Id., at paras. 315-324. 
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would breach Canada‟s international human rights obligations might 
justify a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter because of the impact 
of those activities on Charter rights in Canada. The Court found that such 
a situation did not arise in this case, as it was difficult to perceive of an 
impact on Charter rights in Canada.
40
  
Based in part on the foregoing considerations, the Federal Court 
concluded that individuals held in Canadian Forces detention facilities in 
Afghanistan did not enjoy rights under the Charter, but rather enjoyed 
rights conferred on them by the Afghan constitution and by international 
law.
41
 
By the time this matter was before the Federal Court of Appeal, the 
Supreme Court‟s Khadr decision had been released. The appellants 
argued that the Supreme Court in Khadr had “confirmed that Hape did 
indeed find that the Charter applied extraterritorially in respect of 
fundamental human rights violations at international law”.42 The Federal 
Court of Appeal rejected this argument, and affirmed the lower court‟s 
decision. In so doing, the appellate court expressed agreement with the 
Federal Court‟s reasons, and asserted that “Khadr has not changed the 
principles applicable to the concepts of territoriality and of comity set out 
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Hape.”43  
According to the Federal Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court in 
Khadr had confirmed that comity, or deference for a foreign process, 
should give way where participation in activities in a foreign state would 
place Canada in violation of its international human rights obligations. 
However, it did not follow that the Charter would then apply in the 
territory of that foreign state as a consequence of such a violation.
44
  
The Federal Court of Appeal also pointed out that the disclosure 
order granted by the Supreme Court in Khadr “remained territorial”, in 
                                                                                                             
40  Id., at paras. 325-326. 
41  Id., at para. 327. 
42  Id., at para. 8 (F.C.A.) (quoting para. 37 of the appellants‟ memorandum). 
43  Id., at para. 9. But see Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister), supra, note 21, wherein the 
Federal Court accepted that the Supreme Court in Hape and Khadr had concluded that an exception 
to the general rule that the Charter does not apply extraterritorially arises where the activities of 
Canadian officials operating outside Canada violate Canada‟s international human rights obligations. 
The Court stated at para. 30: 
The Court [in Khadr] referred to its prior decision in R. v. Hape, 2007 SCC 26 where it 
had concluded that the Charter generally does not apply to Canadian investigators 
operating outside of Canada. But Hape had also identified an exception to that general 
rule where the activities of Canadian agents violated Canada‟s international obligations, 
particularly its human rights commitments.  
44  Amnesty, id., at paras. 19-20. 
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that it only encompassed Canadian documents.
45
 It characterized Khadr 
as “a case where a Canadian citizen obtained disclosure of documents 
held in Canada and produced by Canadian officials for a breach of his 
rights under section 7 of the Charter by Canadian officials participating 
in a foreign process that violated Canada‟s international human rights 
obligations.”46 According to the Court of Appeal, the factual underpinning 
of Khadr was “miles apart” from the situation in Amnesty, where 
“foreigners, with no attachment whatsoever to Canada or its laws, are 
held in CF detention facilities in Afghanistan”.47 The Supreme Court of 
Canada denied the appellants leave to appeal.  
2. Beneficiaries of Charter Rights 
A second issue arising from the Supreme Court‟s jurisprudence on 
the extraterritorial application of the Charter is the extent to which a non-
Canadian citizen outside Canada who is not subjected to a Canadian 
judicial process is entitled to claim Charter rights.
48
 
                                                                                                             
45  Id., at para. 11. 
46  Id., at para. 13. 
47  Id., at para. 14. 
48  The issue of whether non-citizens residing outside Canada are able to claim rights under 
the Charter has also arisen in the immigration law context. Recent jurisprudence in this area suggests 
that non-citizens residing outside Canada are not entitled to the protection of the Charter. See Deol v. 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] F.C.J. No. 1034, 2001 FCT 694 
(F.C.T.D.), affd on other grounds [2002] F.C.J. No. 949, 2002 FCA 271 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal 
refused [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 358 (S.C.C.); Lee v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 
[1997] F.C.J. No. 242, 126 F.T.R. 229 (F.C.T.D.); Ruparel v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration), [1990] F.C.J. No. 701, [1990] 3 F.C. 615 (F.C.T.D.); and the discussion in L. 
Waldman, Immigration Law and Practice, 2d ed., vol. 1 (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2005), 
at §2.13. Note, however, that in Crease v. Canada, [1994] 3 F.C. 480, [1994] F.C.J. No. 711 
(F.C.T.D.), the Federal Court (Trial Division) found that the plaintiff, a Venezuelan citizen residing 
outside Canada, had standing to bring a claim relying on s. 15(1) of the Charter. In this case, the 
plaintiff sought to challenge a provision of the Citizenship Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-29, which 
precluded him from being granted Canadian citizenship in part because his mother was not a citizen 
at the time of his birth in Venezuela. Although his mother had been born in Canada, at the time of 
the plaintiff`s birth in 1943 anyone born in Canada was considered to be a British subject; the term 
“Canadian citizen” did not come into effect until 1947. The Court determined that the plaintiff had 
standing to bring a Charter challenge because the impugned law, as a domestic law, was subject to 
Charter scrutiny, and because the plaintiff had a “direct connection to Canada” by birth to a 
Canadian-born mother. The Court also believed that it would be “untenable” to deny him standing to 
bring the Charter challenge on the basis that he was not a citizen, as his challenge was to the very 
provision which prevented him from being granted citizenship. Ultimately, however, the Court 
dismissed the action on the basis that to apply the Charter in this case would result in an 
impermissible retroactive application of the Charter, and that the plaintiff‟s Charter rights had not 
been infringed. See also Chazi c. Québec (Procureur général), [2008] J.Q. no. 8692 (Que. C.A.), 
leave to appeal refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 461 (S.C.C.), wherein the Quebec Court of Appeal 
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In her dissenting reasons in Cook, L‟Heureux-Dubé J. (McLachlin J., 
as she then was, concurring) asserted that determining whether a person 
claiming a Charter right is the holder of such a right should precede an 
analysis of the Charter‟s application under section 32(1). She wrote: 
As a preliminary note I point out that my colleagues‟ reasons, like the 
arguments of the parties, proceed on the assumption that the appellant 
held Charter rights, even though he was neither present in Canada, nor 
a Canadian citizen, at the time of the alleged violation of these rights. 
In my opinion, this analysis misses a crucial first step — a 
determination of whether the person claiming a Charter right is indeed 
the holder of a right under the Canadian constitution. The question of 
whether the claimant holds a right, in my view, must logically be 
determined prior to the question of whether there is state action 
involved that may have infringed that right.
49
  
The accused in Cook was an American citizen who had been 
interrogated by Canadian detectives in the United States and prosecuted 
in Canada for a murder that occurred in Canada. At his criminal trial in 
Canada, he sought to have a statement obtained by the Canadian police 
in the United States excluded on the basis that it had been obtained in 
violation of his section 10(b) Charter right to counsel, which is 
guaranteed to “everyone”, on arrest or detention.50 Neither party had put 
forward arguments on the question of whether the appellant was the 
beneficiary of this right, and the question was conceded by the Crown. 
Without deciding the issue, L‟Heureux-Dubé J. cautioned against an 
interpretation of the term “everyone” that did not take into account the 
purposes of the Charter. She wrote: 
The term “everyone” seems quite broad. Nevertheless, interpreting it 
must take into account the purposes of the Charter. I am not convinced 
that passage of the Charter necessarily gave rights to everyone in the 
world, of every nationality, wherever they may be, even if certain rights 
contain the word “everyone”. Rather, I think that it is arguable that 
“everyone” was used to distinguish the rights granted to everyone on 
the territory of Canada from those granted only to citizens of Canada 
and those granted to persons charged with an offence.
51
 
                                                                                                             
reviewed the jurisprudence in this area but decided that it was not necessary to decide in that case 
whether the appellants could claim the protection of s. 15(1) of the Charter (id., at paras. 63-92). 
49  Cook, supra, note 5, at para. 85. 
50  Section 10(b) provides that: “Everyone has the right on arrest or detention … to retain 
and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right.”  
51  Cook, supra, note 5, at para. 86. 
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Justice L‟Heureux-Dubé‟s concerns have been acknowledged by 
other Supreme Court of Canada Justices. The majority in Hape noted her 
assertion that a determination of whether someone is a rights holder 
should precede an analysis of whether there is state action.
52
 In addition, 
the majority in Cook did consider whether finding that the Charter 
applied in that case would result in Charter rights that are guaranteed to 
“everyone” being conferred too broadly. Writing for the majority, Cory 
and Iacobucci JJ. stressed that their holding that the Charter applied to 
the actions of the Canadian detectives was based on the particular facts 
of that case. They wrote: 
We caution that the holding in this case marks an exception to the 
general rule in public international law … that a state cannot enforce its 
laws beyond its territory. The exception arises on the basis of very 
particular facts before us. Specifically, the impugned actions were 
undertaken by Canadian governmental authorities in connection with 
the investigation of a murder committed in Canada for a process to be 
undertaken in Canada. The appellant, the rights claimant herein, was 
being compulsorily brought before the Canadian justice system. This 
situation is far different from the myriad of circumstances in which 
persons outside Canada are trying to claim the benefits of the Charter 
simpliciter.
53
  
In these circumstances, the majority believed that it was “reasonable to 
permit the appellant, who … [was] being made to adhere to Canadian 
criminal law and procedure, to claim Canadian constitutional rights 
relating to the interview conducted by the Canadian detectives in New 
Orleans”.54 
More recently, the issue of whether non-Canadian citizens outside 
Canada are entitled to claim Charter rights was addressed in Amnesty. 
The Federal Court of Appeal in Amnesty disposed of the appeal in part 
on the basis that the detainees did not have rights guaranteed to 
“everyone” under the Charter. With regard to this issue, the Court stated 
that “[e]ven though section 7 of the Charter applies to „Everyone …‟ 
(compare with the words „Every citizen …‟ in section 6 of the Charter) 
all the circumstances in a given situation must be examined before it can 
be said that the Charter applies.”55 The Court concluded that in the 
                                                                                                             
52  Hape, supra, note 4, at para. 81. 
53  Cook, supra, note 5, at para. 53. 
54  Id., at para. 51. 
55  Amnesty, supra, note 32, at para. 20 (F.C.A.). 
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circumstances, the detainees, as foreigners in another country with no 
attachment to Canada or its laws, could not claim Charter rights.
56
  
This issue was also recently addressed by the Federal Court in Slahi 
v. Canada (Minister of Justice).
57
 Like Omar Khadr, the applicants in this 
case — Mohamedou Ould Slahi and Ahcene Zemiri — were detainees in 
Guantanamo Bay. Canadian officials had interviewed them in Guantanamo 
Bay and had passed on information from those interviews to U.S. 
authorities. Slahi and Zemiri sought disclosure from the federal Crown of 
records of the interviews and records of information shared with the 
United States for the purposes of habeas corpus petitions initiated by 
them in the U.S. District Court. After the Crown refused to comply with 
their requests, they brought an application for judicial review in the 
Federal Court in Canada, alleging that their section 7 Charter rights had 
been violated and seeking an order under section 24(1) of the Charter 
directing disclosure.  
The Federal Court declined to accept the Crown‟s attempts to 
distinguish Khadr on the basis, among other things, that the applicants 
sought disclosure for the purposes of their U.S. habeas corpus 
proceedings in the U.S. District Court, rather than for prosecution in the 
military commission regime impugned by the U.S. Supreme Court as 
described in Khadr, and that there was an effective documentary 
discovery process in the U.S. District Court. 
The Federal Court found this case to be virtually identical to Khadr, 
in that Canadian officials had participated in a process at Guantanamo 
Bay that violated Canada‟s international human rights law obligations. 
Nonetheless, the Court dismissed the application, distinguishing Khadr 
on the basis that as non-Canadian citizens outside Canada with no 
sufficient connection to Canada, the applicants were not entitled to avail 
themselves of the rights guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter.  
In its analysis, the Court pointed to the dissenting comments of 
L‟Heureux-Dubé J. in Cook, wherein she expressed doubt that the use of 
the term “everyone” in certain provisions of the Charter “gave rights to 
everyone in the world, of every nationality, wherever they may be”.58 
The Court was also guided by what it saw as the purpose of the Charter, 
                                                                                                             
56  Id., at paras. 14-21. The Federal Court also found that the detainees did not possess rights 
under the Charter (Amnesty, id., at para. 327 (F.C.)). 
57  [2009] F.C.J. No. 141, 2009 FC 160 (F.C.), affd 2009 FCA 259 (F.C.A.) [hereinafter 
“Slahi & Zemiri”]. At the time of writing, leave to appeal had not been sought from the Supreme 
Court of Canada. 
58  Id., at para. 43 (F.C.), citing Cook, supra, note 5. 
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namely to enshrine and protect the fundamental rights of Canadian 
citizens and those within Canadian territory. The Court stated as follows: 
It must be remembered that the Charter, an integral part of Canada‟s 
supreme law, is a Canadian instrument enacted to enshrine and protect 
the fundamental rights of Canadians and those finding themselves 
within Canada‟s territory. Its extraterritorial reach is exceptional and 
limited, as is mandated by respect for the principles of sovereignty and 
judicial comity.
59
 
The Court also remarked that the Supreme Court in Khadr had noted on 
several occasions that Mr. Khadr was a Canadian citizen. Most 
significant for the Court was the fact that the Supreme Court had created 
a link between Canada‟s duty under section 7 to provide disclosure and 
the fact that the liberty interests of a Canadian citizen were engaged. The 
Court stated: 
In its reasons, the Supreme Court noted several times that Mr. Khadr 
was a Canadian citizen. Perhaps the most compelling of these passages 
is at paragraph 31 where the Supreme Court stated: 
… Thus, s. 7 imposes a duty on Canada to provide disclosure 
of materials in its possession arising from its participation in 
the foreign process that is contrary to international law and 
jeopardizes the liberty of a Canadian citizen. [My emphasis.]
60
 
The Court in Slahi & Zemiri reviewed Supreme Court of Canada 
case law pertaining, for the most part, to the extraterritorial application of 
the Charter, and found that the jurisprudence illustrated that the 
protection of section 7 may be available to three categories of 
individuals: (1) non-Canadians who are physically present in Canada;
61
 
(2) non-Canadians who are subject to a criminal trial in Canada;
62
 and (3) 
Canadian citizens outside Canada, in exceptional circumstances.
63
 The 
                                                                                                             
59  Id., at para. 48. 
60  Id., at para. 45. 
61  See, e.g., Singh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] S.C.J. No. 
11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (S.C.C.). In Singh, the issue was whether individuals physically present in 
Canada who had been denied refugee status were entitled to the protection of s. 7 of the Charter. 
Writing for Dickson C.J.C. and Lamer J. with respect to the Charter issue, Wilson J. accepted that 
the term “everyone” in s. 7 of the Charter “includes every human being who is physically present in 
Canada and by virtue of such presence amenable to Canadian law” (id., at para. 35). 
62  See, e.g., Cook, supra, note 5. As was stated above, in Cook the accused was an 
American citizen who had been questioned by Canadian police outside the country for the purposes 
of his criminal trial in Canada. 
63  See, e.g., R. v. A., [1990] S.C.J. No. 43, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 995 (S.C.C.); Khadr, supra, note 
6. In R. v. A., the appellants were Canadian citizens, one of whom had been subpoenaed to testify in 
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Court concluded from its review that in order for section 7 Charter rights 
to be asserted, the circumstances must connect the claimant with Canada, 
either through presence in Canada, a criminal trial in Canada or Canadian 
citizenship.
64
 
In this case, the Court found that there was no such requisite 
connection. Neither applicant was present in Canada, subject to a 
criminal trial in Canada, or a Canadian citizen. The Court found that Mr. 
Slahi had resided in Montreal for approximately two months, between 
November 26, 1999 and January 21, 2000, after having been granted 
landed immigrant status.
65
 Mr. Zemiri had been a resident from 1994 to 
June 2001, but he had never obtained permanent resident status in 
Canada.
66
 The Court found that these circumstances were not sufficient 
to establish a nexus to Canada such that the applicants‟ section 7 rights 
could be engaged. Nonetheless, the Court declined to award costs in this 
matter, “in view of the uncertain state of the law on the question of the 
extraterritorial application of the Charter to non-Canadians”.67 An appeal 
to the Federal Court of Appeal was dismissed with costs, substantially 
for the reasons given by the Federal Court. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper has identified two issues arising from the Hape and 
Khadr decisions that the Federal Courts have addressed. There are 
several additional questions arising from these decisions that future 
                                                                                                             
a criminal trial in Canada. As a result of a perceived threat to their security arising from the 
testimony, particularly to the security of two of them who were outside the country, the appellants 
applied to quash the subpoena or for a remedy under s. 24(1) of the Charter. The Superior Court 
dismissed the matter, in part on the basis that because two of the applicants were outside the country, 
a s. 24(1) remedy was not available to them. When the matter came before the Supreme Court, the 
majority directed a new hearing before the Superior Court. They noted that the appellants were all 
Canadian citizens, that the RCMP had undertaken in Canada to provide them with protection, that 
one of the appellants was required to testify in Canada, and that the two appellants outside Canada 
had left in part due to assurances given by the RCMP. The majority stated (at para. 6) that:  
[i]n those circumstances the judge was in error both in failing to consider the safety of the 
appellants and in finding that in the special circumstances of this case remedies were not 
available to persons who were out of the country. 
. . . . . 
In the circumstances, the presiding judge might consider exercising either the inherent 
jurisdiction of the court or the application of an appropriate Charter remedy. 
64  Slahi & Zemiri, supra, note 57, at para. 47 (F.C.). 
65  Id., at para. 8. 
66  Id., at para. 13. 
67  Id., at para. 55. 
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courts in Canada may be required to consider. For example, to what 
extent would a Canadian court pronounce on another country‟s adherence 
to international law? The Supreme Court did not have to address this 
issue in Khadr, in light of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court 
holding that detainees at Guantanamo Bay had illegally been denied 
access to habeas corpus and that the procedures under which they were 
to be prosecuted violated the Geneva Conventions. In Khadr, the Court 
noted that issues may arise about whether it is appropriate for a Canadian 
court to pronounce on the legality of a process within the territory of 
another country.
68
  
Questions may also arise concerning the nature of conduct sufficient 
to constitute “participation” in activities that violate international human 
rights obligations. In Khadr, the Supreme Court was careful to define 
Canada‟s participation as sharing the product of the interviews with U.S. 
authorities, as opposed to actually conducting the interviews of Mr. 
Khadr. The Court wrote that “[m]erely conducting interviews with a 
Canadian citizen held abroad under a violative process may not 
constitute participation in that process,” as “[i]ndeed, it may often be 
essential that Canadian officials interview citizens being held by 
violative regimes to provide assistance to them.”69 
In addition, courts may be called on to define exceptions, besides 
consent, to the territorial jurisdiction of states as recognized by 
international law, and to pronounce on how they would affect the 
extraterritorial application of the Charter.
70
 For example, a future court 
may be required to pronounce on whether extra-territorial jurisdiction in 
                                                                                                             
68  Khadr, supra, note 6, at para. 21. 
69  Id., at para. 27. 
70  In Amnesty, supra, note 32, the Federal Courts determined that “effective military control 
of the person” was not an exceptional basis recognized at international law that would allow for the 
extra-territorial application of the Charter. Note that the U.S. Supreme Court, the House of Lords 
and the European Court of Human Rights have all held, in determining the extraterritorial 
application of different human rights instruments, that a state exercises jurisdiction outside its own 
territory only under very limited, exceptional circumstances recognized at international law (see 
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, at 2257-2259 (2008); Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, at 
2220-2222, 2225 (2008); Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 26, at paras. 49, 
97, 109; Bankovic v. Belgium (2001), 11 BHRC 435 (GC), at paras. 59-60, 71, 73). The European 
Court of Human Rights has indicated that those exceptional circumstances are: (a) consent: the 
government of the state with de jure sovereignty over the territory consents to the application of the 
laws of a foreign state; (b) effective control of territory: a state occupies territory of another state, 
exercising all or some of the public powers normally exercised by the government; or (c) specific 
situations where customary international law and treaty provisions have recognized the 
extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction, such as within embassies or on board aircraft and vessels 
registered in or flying the flag of that state. See Bankovic v. Belgium, id., at paras. 59-60, 71, 73. 
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respect of embassies and consulates exists in international law, and 
whether the Charter applies within a Canadian embassy or consulate. 
It is important to recognize that it does not follow from a 
determination that the Charter does not apply extra-territorially that no 
laws will apply to the conduct of Canadian officials outside Canada. 
Moreover, as the decisions in Amnesty demonstrate, there is a framework 
of international law which has as its object the protection of human 
rights. 
